Can one use the discrete logarithm problem in matrix groups, to build a better and secure cryptosystem? We argue, it is indeed the case. This makes the group of circulant matrices suitable and attractive for lightweight cryptography.
INTRODUCTION
Two of the most popular groups used in the discrete logarithm problem are the group of units of a finite field and the group of rational points of an elliptic curve over a finite field. The obvious question arises, are there any other groups? There are matrix groups out there, for example, the group of circulant matrices; that offers the same security of a finite field of about same size, with half the computational cost. In this paper, we denote the group of non-singular circulant matrices of size d by C(d, q) and the group of special circulant matrices, i.e., circulant matrices with determinant 1, by SC(d, q) respectively.
Let us pause here and discuss, what is a better security? Assume we are working with some algebraic structure defined over a finite field F q . This algebraic structure can be a group, a vector space or something similar; in which the discrete logarithm problem makes sense. If it turns out, solving the discrete logarithm problem in that structure, is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem in some extension F q k of F q , for k > 1, then obviously there is a security advantage in working with that structure. This way, one can even quantify the security, bigger the k better is the discrete logarithm problem. This is what we mean by better security. A good example of better security is the group of elliptic curves. Due to the MOV attack [7] , one can reduce the discrete logarithm problem in an elliptic curve over F q , to a discrete logarithm problem in F q k . For elliptic curves, this k, the embedding degree, is usually very large. This is one of the biggest security advantage of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which makes it a standard in public key cryptography.
In this paper, we show that the elliptic curves are not the only one with better security. It is known, the group of non-singular circulant matrices of size d over F q , offers security of F q d−1 [6] . The square and multiply algorithm with these circulant matrices is faster than that of a finite field of about the same size. The bottleneck for security being d, the size of the matrix. So to get a really large security advantage, the size of the matrix must be really big. See Section 4.1 for a detailed discussion.
Definition 1 (Circulant matrix C(d, q)). A d × d matrix over a field F is called a circulant matrix, if every row except the first row, is a right circular shift of the row above that. So a circulant matrix is defined by its first row. One can define a circulant matrix similarly using columns.
A matrix is a two dimensional object, but a circulant matrix behaves like a one dimensional object; given by the first row or the first column. We will denote a circulant matrix C of size d, with the first row c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c d−1 , by C = circ (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c d−1 ). An example of a circulant 5 × 5 matrix is:
One can define a representer polynomial corresponding to the circulant matrix C as φ C = c 0 + c 1 x + c 2 x 2 + . . . + c d−1 x d−1 . The circulants form a commutative ring under matrix multiplication and matrix addition and is isomorphic to (the isomorphism being circulant matrix to the representer
For more on circulant matrices, see [2] .
We will study the discrete logarithm problem in SC(d, q) in this paper. It is fairly straightforward to see that one can develop a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol or the ElGamal cryptosystem from this discrete logarithm problem. The ElGamal cryptosystem is described below.
All fields considered in this paper are finite and of characteristic 2.
THE ELGAMAL OVER SC(d, q)
Private Key: m, m ∈ N. 
Decryption.
a: Alice knows m, when she receives the ciphertext A r , A mr v T , she computes A mr from A r , then A −mr and then computes v from A mr v T . We first show that the security of the discrete logarithm problem in SL(d, q), the special linear group of all matrices of size d with determinant 1, is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman problem. Since SC(d, q) is contained in SL(d, q), this proves that the discrete logarithm problem is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman problem in SC(d, q). Assume that Eve can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem, then from the public information, she knows A m . From a ciphertext A r , A rm v T she gets A r . Since she can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem, she computes A rm and can decrypt the ciphertext. The converse follows from the following theorem, which is an adaptation of [4, Proposition 2.10] Theorem 1. Suppose Eve has access to an oracle that can decrypt arbitrary ciphertext of the above cryptosystem for any private key, then she can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem in SL(d, q).
Proof. Let g = A a and h = A b . Eve takes an arbitrary element v in the vector space of dimension d on which SL(d, q) acts. We use the same basis used for the representation of SL(d, q).
She pretends that A and A a is a public key. Sends that information to the oracle. Then asks the oracle to decrypt (h, c). Oracle sends back to Eve, h −a c. Eve knowing v, computes the i th column of A ab from h −1 c. In d tries A ab is found. This solves the Diffie-Hellman problem.
SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM
This paper is primarily focused on the discrete logarithm problem in the automorphism group of a vector space over a finite field. There are two kinds of attack on the discrete logarithm problem.
(i) The "so called" generic attacks, like the Pollard's rho algorithm. These attacks use a black box group algorithm. The time complexity of these algorithms is about the same as the square-root of the size of the group. (ii) The other one is an index calculus attack. These attacks do not work in any group. Black box group algorithms work in any group, hence they will work in SC(d, q) as well. The most efficient way to use black box attack on the discrete logarithm problem, is to use the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [4, Section 2.9] first. This reduces the discrete logarithm problem to the prime divisors of the order of the element (the base for the discrete logarithm) and then use the Chinese remainder theorem to construct a solution for the original discrete logarithm problem. One can use the Pollard's rho algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem in the prime divisors. So the whole process can be summarized as follows: the security of the discrete logarithm against generic attacks, is the security of the discrete logarithm in the largest prime divisor of the order. We cannot prevent these attacks. These generic attacks are of exponential time complexity and are not of much concern.
The biggest threat to any cryptosystem using the discrete logarithm problem is a subexponential attack like the index calculus attack [9] . It is often argued [5, 10] that there is no index calculus algorithm for most elliptic curve cryptosystems that has subexponential time complexity. This fact is often used to promote elliptic curve cryptosystem over a finite field cryptosystem [5] . So, the best we can hope from the discrete logarithm problem in SC(d, q) is, there is no index calculus attack or the index calculus attack becomes exponential.
The expected asymptotic complexity of the index calculus algorithm in
, where c is a constant, see [9] and [5, Section 4] . If the degree of the extension, k, is greater than log 2 q then the asymptotic time complexity of the index calculus algorithm becomes exponential. In our case this means, if d > log 2 q, the asymptotic complexity of the index calculus algorithm on circulant matrices of size d becomes exponential.
If we choose d ≥ log 2 q, then the discrete logarithm problem in SC(d, q) becomes as secure as the ElGamal over an elliptic curve, because the index calculus algorithm is exponential; otherwise we can not guarantee. But on the other hand, in the proposed cryptosystem, encryption and decryption works in F q and breaking the cryptosystem depends on solving a discrete logarithm problem in F q d−1 . Since, implementing the index calculus attack becomes harder as the field gets bigger. It is clear that if we take d log 2 q, then the cryptosystem is much more secure than the ElGamal cryptosystem over F q .
IS THE ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM OVER SC(d, q) REALLY USEFUL?
For a circulant matrix over a field of even characteristic, squaring is fast. It is shown [6, Theorem 2.2] that, if A = circ (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a d−1 ), then A 2 = circ a 2 π(0) , a 2 π(1) , . . . , a 2 π(d−1) . Where π is a permutation of {0, 1, 2, . . . , d − 1}. Now the a i s belong to the underlying field F q of characteristic 2. In this field, squaring is just a cyclic shift using a normal basis [8, Chapter 4] representation of the field elements.
It was shown by Mahalanobis [6] , that if five conditions are satisfied, then the security of the discrete logarithm problem for circulant matrices of size d over F q is the same as the discrete logarithm problem in F q d−1 .
The five conditions are:
e. q is primitive mod d. In short, the argument for these five conditions are the following:
Let A = circ (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a d−1 ) and let χ A be the characteristic polynomial of A. It is easy to see that the row-sum, a 0 + a 1 + · · · + a d−1 , sum of all elements in a row, is constant for a circulant matrix. This row-sum, α is an eigenvalue of A and belongs to F q . Clearly, α m is an eigenvalue of A m . This α and α m can reduce a part of the discrete logarithm problem in A, to a discrete logarithm problem in the field F q . If the row-sum is 1, then there is no such issue. This is the reason behind the condition, the row-sum is 1. Now assume that
. . . f en n , where each f i is an irreducible polynomial and e i s are positive integers 1 . Then it follows, the discrete logarithm problem in A, can be reduced to discrete logarithm problems in
for each i. Then one can solve the individual discrete logarithms in extensions of F q , put those solutions together using the Chinese remainder theorem and solve the discrete logarithm problem in A. The degree of these extensions, the size of which provides us with the better security, is maximized when χ A x − 1 is irreducible. This is the reason for
The ring of circulant matrices is isomorphic to
polynomial. If d is prime and q is primitive modulo d, then the cyclotomic polynomial Φ(x) is irreducible. In this case, the discrete logarithm problem in circulant matrices reduce to the discrete logarithm problem in F q d−1 .
4.1.
What are the advantages of using circulant matrices? The advantages of using circulant matrices are:
• Multiplying circulant matrices of size d over F q is twice as fast compared to multiplication in the field of size F q d . 1 Condition c. ensures that e i = 1 for all i.
• Computing the inverse of a circulant matrix is easy. Since any circulant matrix A can be represented as a polynomial of the form f (x) = c 0 +c 1 x+. . .+c d−1 x d−1 . This polynomial is invertible, implies that, gcd f (x), x d − 1 = 1. Then one can use the extended Euclid's algorithm to find the inverse. In our cryptosystem, we need to find that inverse, and it is easily computable.
We now compare the following three cryptosystems for security and speed. We do not compare the key sizes and the size of the ciphertext, as these can be decided easily.
1. The ElGamal cryptosystem using the circulant matrices of size d over F q . 2. The ElGamal cryptosystem using the group of an elliptic curve over the finite field F q . 3. The ElGamal cryptosystem over F q d .
4.2.
ElGamal over F q d vs. the circulants of size d over F q . Clearly the circulants are the winner in this case. The circulants provide almost the same security as the ElGamal over the finite field F q d , but multiplication in the circulants is twice as fast compared to the multiplication in the finite field F q d .
To understand the difference, we need to understand the standard field multiplication. A field F q d over F q , an extension of degree d, is a commutative algebra of dimension d over F q . Let α 0 , α 1 , . . . , α d−1 be a basis of F q d over F q . Let A := (a 0 α 0 + a 1 α 1 + · · · + a d−1 α d−1 ), B := (b 0 α 0 + b 1 α 1 + · · · + b d−1 α d−1 ) and
The objective of multiplication is to find c k for k = 0, 1, . . . , (d − 1). Now notice that, if
The number of nonzero entries in the matrix T k , which is constant over k, is called the complexity of the field multiplication [8, Chapter 5]. The following theorem is well known [8, Theorem 5.1]:
Theorem 2. For any normal basis N of F q d over F q , the complexity of multiplication is at least 2d − 1.
Note that in an implementation of a field exponentiation, one must use a normal basis to use the square and multiply algorithm.
In our case, circulants of size d over a finite field F q , the situation is much different. We need a normal basis implementation for F q . However, to implement multiplication of two circulants, i.e., multiplication in
we can use the basis 1, x, x 2 , . . . , x d−1 .
In a very similar way as before, if A := a 0 + a 1 x + . . . + a d−1 x d−1 and
Our job is to compute c k for k = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1. It follows that
It is now clear that the complexity of the multiplication is d. Compare this to the best case situation for the optimal normal basis [8, Chapter 5], in which case it is 2d − 1. So multiplying circulants take about half the time that of finite fields. It is clear that the keysizes will be the same for both these cryptosystems.
4.3.
The elliptic curve ElGamal vs. the circulants of size d, both on the same field F q . In this case there is no clear winner. On one hand, take the case of embedding degree. For most elliptic curves the embedding degree is very large. The embedding degree, that we refer to as the security advantage, for a circulant is tied up with the size of the matrix. For a matrix of size d, it is d−1. So with circulants, it is hard to get very large embedding degree, without blowing up the size of the matrix. On the other hand, a very large embedding degree is not always necessary.
On the other hand, in elliptic curves, the order of the group is about the same as the size of the field. For 80-bit security, we must take the field to be around 2 160 , to defend against any square-root algorithms. In the case of circulants, the order of a circulant matrix can be large. This enables us to use smaller field with the same security. In circulants, one can use the extended Euclid's algorithm to compute the inverse.
So, as we said before, we are not in a position to declare a clear winner in this case. However, if the size of the field is important in the implementation, and a moderate embedding degree suffices for security, then circulants are a little ahead in the game. We explain this by some examples in the next section.
It is clear that the keysize for circulant matrices will be larger than that of the elliptic curve cryptosystem, both satisfying the following:
1: Security of 80 bits or more from generic algorithms. 2: Security from index-calculus comparable to the field F 2 1000 , i.e., index calculus security of 1000 bits.
AN ALGORITHM
Recall that C(d, q) is isomorphic to
. We now describe an algorithm to find a circulant matrix satisfying the above five conditions. Algorithm 1 (Construct a circulant matrix satisfying five conditions).
Input q, d.
• order ← Order of the companion matrix of τ (x).
• Use Chinese remainder theorem to find ψ(x) such that ψ(x) = 1 mod (x − 1) and ψ(
Using Magma [1] and Algorithm 1, we were able to compute several circulant matrices over many different fields of characteristic 2. We produce part of that data in Table 1 . The row with q is the size of the field extension and the row with d is the size of the circulant matrix over that field extension.
To construct the table, we considered all possible field extensions of size q, where q varies from 2 40 to 2 100 . For each such extension, we took all the primes, d, from 11 to 50. We then checked and tabulated the ones for which q is primitive modulo d. For every extension q and for all primes d, satisfying the primitivity condition, Algorithm 1 was used and the output matrix was checked for all the five conditions and moreover the order of the matrix A was found to be at least q d−3 . So, if q is primitive modulo d, our algorithm produces the desired matrix A, satisfying all five conditions. The computation was fast on a standard workstation.
So now it is clear, that there are a lot of choices for parameters for the ElGamal cryptosystem over circulant matrices. We describe our findings with some arbitrary examples. For more data see Table 2 .
In the case, q = 2 89 , d = 13, we found the largest prime factor of the order of A to be 7993364465170792998716337691033251350895453313.
The base two logarithm of this prime is 152.5. So even if we use the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm to reduce the discrete logarithm in A, to the discrete logarithm problem in the prime factors of the order of A, we still have the q 2 41 2 43 2 47 2 49 2 53 2 55 d 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 13, 19, 29, 37 29, 37 37 37 29, 37 29, 37 q 2 59 2 61 2 65 2 67 2 71 2 73 d 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 29, 37 29, 37 29, 37 29, 37 29, 37 29, 37 q 2 77 2 79 2 83 2 85 2 89 2 95 d 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 13, 19, 29, 37 29, 37 37 29, 37 29, 37 37 TABLE 1. Fields from size 2 40 to 2 100 and matrices from size 11 to 50 that satisfy those five conditions. security very close to the 80-bit security from generic attacks. The security against the index calculus is the same as in F 2 1068 .
In case of q = 2 39 , d = 29, the largest prime factor of A was 3194753987813988499397428643895659569.
The logarithm base 2 of which is about 120. So from generic attack, the security is about 2 60 or sixty bit security. From index calculus the security is the same as the security of a field of size F 2 1092 . In the case of q = 2 45 , d = 29, the largest prime factor of the order of A is 15169173997557864184867895400813639018421 with more than 60 bit security. The security against the index calculus is equivalent to F 2 1260 .
In the case of q = 2 97 , d = 11, the largest prime divisor of A is 50996843392805314313033252108853668830963472293743769141 − 06957559915561, the logarithm base 2 is 231. Security from generic attacks is 115 bits and from index calculus is equivalent to the field F 2 970 , i.e., 970 bits security.
In the case of q = 2 43 , d = 29, the largest prime factor of the order is 1597133026914484603924687622599912490649282490944114 − 1855981389550399714935349, the logarithm of that is 253. So this has about 125 bit security from the generic attacks and 1204 bit security from index calculus attack. In the case of q = 2 29 , d = 37, the largest prime factor is 328017025014102923449988663752960080886511412965881, with logarithm 167, i.e., security of more than 80 bits from generic attacks and 1044 bits from index calculus.
Using GAP [3] , we created Table 2 . In this table, all extensions q, q from 2 45 to 2 90 and all primes from 10 to 20 are considered. For those extensions and primes, it was checked if q is primitive mod d. If that was so, then the circulant matrix A was constructed and both the generic and the index calculus security was tabulated.
5.1.
Complexity of exponentiation of a circulant matrix of size d. Let us assume, that the circulant matrix of size d is A and we are raising it to power m, i.e., compute A m . We are using the square and multiply algorithm. We know that squaring of circulants is free, and multiplication of two circulant matrices of size d takes about d 2 field multiplications. The number of multiplications in the exponentiation is the same as the number of ones in the binary expansion of m. It is expected that a finite random string of zeros and ones will have about the same number of zeros and ones. So the expected number of ones in the binary expansion of m is 1 2 log 2 m. So the expected number of field multiplications required to compute A m is d 2 2 log 2 m.
